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A critical survey and comparison of French and Scandinavian frameworks for the description of linguistic polyphony and dialogism

1. Introduction

In 2004, Henning Nølke, Kjetil Fløttum and Cécile Norén wrote in their monograph *ScaPolLex. La Théorie scandinave de la polyphonie linguistique*: "There are nearly as many conceptions of the notion of polyphony as there are authors using it" (2004, 13). We could even say: "There are nearly as many frameworks, recontextualizations or theorizations of polyphony and dialogism, as there are scholars working on those notions".

In this study, I will present and discuss four of those theorizations: first, the theory of polyphony set out by Oswald Ducrot in 1984; secondly, the model elaborated by Henning Nølke, which developed in the late 90s into the ScaPoLine (the Scandinavian Theory of Linguistic Polyphony); thirdly, the theorization and application of the notion of polyphony by Hans Kronning in the description of some (mostly modal) expressions; and fourthly, the framework proposed by Jacques Bres for the description of what he calls (linguistic) markers of dialogism.

It is rather easy to find a presentation text for each of these co-existing frameworks of polyphony or dialogism. For Oswald Ducrot, the basic text is the famous Chapter 8 of his 1984 book *Le dire et le dit*, a chapter based on three previous articles (Ducrot 1982, 1984a and 1984c). For Kronning, a good presentation of his polyphonic stratification account can be found in Chapter 5 of his 1996 book *Modalité, cognition et polyphonie idématique du verbe rendu devoir*. The best overview of Jacques Bres's framework and the linguistic facts it describes can be found in Bres (1998) and (1999) and, in condensed form, in the dictionary of praeformatics by Detorie, Siblot & Verine (2001) under the headers "Dialogique", "Dialogisme", "Marqueurs dialogiques". For

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Nälle it is less easy to pick out the text that best describes his framework, because there are a whole series of introductions to it by the author, mostly in proceedings of conferences, seminars and meetings. Important first of all are some sections of Nälle (1994), but useful also are the long article by Nälle & Olsen (2000) or the shorter and simpler version of that text in Nälle (2001b), and of course, the latest book of the linguistic sub-team of the Scandinavian Polyphonists: ScuPoLine. *La Théorie isodernaire de la polyphonie linguistique* (Nälle, Fljettum & Norén 2004).²

What has been lacking till now in the literature is a comparison of the different variants of the linguistic theory of polyphony and dialogism and an independent evaluation of their respective descriptive and explanatory power and their internal and external consistency.

It is not my ambition to present in this short article an in-depth evaluation of the different frameworks and their underlying principles. I will present here the key concepts of the four approaches, compare them and add some evaluative notes and some questions for each of them.

It is clear that the four theorizations to be presented here do not cover the whole field of the linguistic study of polyphony and dialogism. There are many other authors that use or even theorize those two notions in their work, far too many to list here. What has motivated my selection is that four of the authors studied here propose a complete set of notions, terms and principles meant to describe the polyphonic or dialogical character of certain language data.

I have decided to stay on a theoretical and general level and to compare the structure and elements of the frameworks themselves. An alternative to this approach could have been to take a series of analyses of one and the same language phenomenon, e.g. the causal connective *påsag* ("since", "given that")., of which I have found more than a dozen studies, or the morpheme of the French conditional, also well described in polyphonic terms, and to compare the different accounts given of them – polyphonic and non-polyphonic – in different frameworks. This is a study which will be conducted later after having clearly set the theoretical boundaries of the problem.

The outline of this article is simple. In the following section I will briefly present and discuss the main elements of Ducrot’s version of the theory of polyphony. In section 3, I will compare that version with the one which is directly based on it, the framework of Nälle and the ScuPoLine. In section 4, I will present the main theoretical elements of the polyphonic theory of Cronkling. Finally, in section 5, I will compare those versions of the theory with the framework of Bena.

2 See also most recently Nälle (2006a) and, in English, Nälle (2006b).

2. "A sketch of a polyphonic theory of enunciation" (Ducrot 1984a)

Chapter 8 of Ducrot’s book *La dire et le dit*, entitled “Beskiss d’une théorie polyphonique de l’enunciation” (“A sketch of a polyphonic theory of enunciation”), is more than a reflection on linguistic polyphony; it is the outcome of a general theory of enunciation, in which the notion of polyphony occupies of course an important place (40 of the 60 pages are devoted to that notion).

2.1. Definition of polyphony by Ducrot

What strikes first when reading Ducrot (1984a) is that there is no clear and explicit definition of linguistic polyphony in it. At best you will find a citation like (1) that could serve as a definition:

(1) "c’est l’objet propre d’une conception polyphonique du sens que de montrer comment l’énoncé signale, dans son énonciation, la superposition de plusieurs voix". (p.183)

[the proper object of a polyphonic conception of meaning is to show how an utterance signals, in its enunciation, the superposition of several voices]

In (1) we see that polyphony has to do with a superposition, hence a plurality, of voices. What the nature of these voices is, is not clearly indicated, neither how one has to understand the term "superposition". Let us have a closer look at the notion of *voie* ("voice").

The term voix appears a dozen times in Ducrot’s Chapter 8. It also appears in the French translations of Bakhtin’s works. The problem is that the term *manifesto* is ambiguous. In Ducrot’s text we can distinguish at least two uses of it, illustrated respectively by (2) and (3). Let us first consider (2):

(2) a. "plusieurs voix parlent simultanément" (p.171, our emphasis)
    (several voices speak simultaneously)

b. "Quant à l’énonciateur E, celui selon qui Pierre fumeait autrefois, il est assimilé à un certain ON, à une voix collective, à l’intérieur de laquelle le locuteur est lui-même rangé". (p.231, our emphasis)

[As far as utterer E is concerned, the one according to whom Pierre smoked in the past, he is identified as ‘ON’, a collective voice, within which the speaker is himself to be situated.]
In these two citations, the term *voix* seems to be used metonymically to indicate the *locuteur* (it could easily be replaced by the word *person* for example). The term corresponds to what is called *enunciative source* in the ScoPoLine.

Let us now have a look at the citation in (3):

(3) "D'où l'idée que le sens de l'énoncé, dans la représentation qu'il donne de l'énonciation, peut y faire apparaître des voix qui ne sont pas celles d'un locuteur". (p.204, our emphasis)

(Hence the idea that the meaning of an utterance, in the representation that it gives of the enunciative act, can make *voice* appear that are not those of a speaker.)

In this sentence, *voix* rather seems to indicate a propositional content, something which is said or put forward by an utterer. In those sentences the notion would correspond to the notion *point* of view of the ScoPoLine. According to Pierrum, it is in this second sense that Nelliké has interpreted the term *voie* as we can see from citation (4):

(4) "With a polyphonic conception of meaning, the aim is to demonstrate how utterances can signal the presence of several *voices*, or points of view in Nelliké's terminology". (Pierrum, 2001a, our emphasis)

The polysemic character of the term *voie* has as a consequence that there are (at least) two possible definitions of linguistic polyphony. One could say that:

(5) a. an utterance is polyphonic whenever there is superposition or plurality of *enunciative instances*, or

b. an utterance is polyphonic whenever there is superposition or plurality of *points of view*.  

In Ducrot we do not find a clear position as to which of the two definitions is eventually preferred. Let us now consider the main elements of Ducrot's framework.

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2.2. Main elements of the framework of Ducrot

2.2.1. Enunciative instances

In order to explain the phenomenon of polyphony, Ducrot introduces a distinction between three types of *voix parlants* ("speaking subjects"). First of all, the *locuteur*, which I will translate here, following Nelliké (2006b), as the *locuteur*, secondly the *"énonciateur"* (the enunciator), and thirdly the *"producteur empirique"* (the empirical producer of the utterance).

The *locuteur* for Ducrot is the one who, according to the utterance, is responsible for the utterance act. It is also the one who "puts the enunciators on stage" and it is the one who is indicated in the utterance (if he is) by the marks of the first person (e.g. pronouns).

The *enonciateur* is the instance to whom are attributed the "points de vue" or points of view ("povs") expressed in the sentence.

The *empirical producer* is the instance who is materially responsible for the production of the utterance act, independently of who is linguistically marked in the utterance as being responsible for it. He is not linguistically important in Ducrot's perspective.

Within the locuteur, Ducrot distinguishes further between two subtypes (Nelliké, Pierrum, Noen and Kronning will do the same, and call them "images" of the speaker):

- The *"locuteur-en-tant-que-ref"* (the locuteur as such). He is the enunciative instance taken in his sole activity of being responsible for the utterance act.
- The *"locuteur-en-tant-que-tire-de-monde"* (the locuteur-as-an-entity-of-the-world). He is the enunciative instance taken as a "complete person, with all his characteristics, including the one of responsibility for the utterance act" (1984a, 99).

The enunciator and both instances of the locuteur are what Ducrot calls *thres de discours* ("discourse individuals" or "discourse entities"). The empirical producer is not a discourse entity, he is an extra-linguistic entity.

If we analyze the examples of polyphony given by Ducrot (1984a), we can distinguish three or four types of polyphony within his theory, depending on the kinds of instances that are mobilized:

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3 For the instance it is not clear whether there is a difference between *supplementary* (as in Ducrot's definition) and simple *plenitude* of voices. If there is a difference, then one is in fact four definitions of polyphony in (5).

4 In that case, there will probably also be plenitude of enunciative instances, as was suggested to me by Rint Hietbrandt. The opposite however is not necessarily true. In the case of irony, at least in Ducrot's analysis, there is only one point of view expressed but two intervening instances, an (alleged) enunciator and the locuteur.
Polyphony with two enunciators. That is the case with presupposition and with polemic negation. (The wall is not white). According to Ducrot (1984a), in the case of polemic negation the locutor puts on stage two enunciators defending contrary points of views. One of the two is assimilated with the locutor.

Polyphony with two locutors. This is the case with direct reported speech. In direct reported speech we have a primary locutor ("locuteur premier") and a secondary locutor ("locuteur second") (1984a, 196).

Polyphony with only one enunciator clearly not assimilated with the locutor. This is the case with irony, according to Ducrot. It distinguishes irony from polemic negation, which is of the first type.

Polyphony of the locutor as an entity of the world shown to be dissimilar from the locutor as such: that is the case of auto-irony.

The question is whether in Ducrot's view this last case is a type apart or a subtype of the third one. What Ducrot has called the locutor as an entity of the world is in fact an entity whose main characteristic is to present a point of view. In that sense he is nothing else than an enunciator. The ScuPoLine clearly distinguishes the third and fourth types, because the fourth type is a case of *internal* polyphony, the third a case of *external* polyphony.

What this simple classification shows is that polyphony can be looked upon as the co-presence of at least two discourse entities, two entities that do not share the same point of view and/or that do not represent the same person.

2.2.2. Points of view

The notion of point of view (pov) is another important theoretical element in Ducrot's system. Pov's for Ducrot are semantic units not bound to a specific form. With this characterization of pov's, Ducrot tackled the problem of sentences containing a negative polarity item, like *grand-chose* (or *foggiest* in English). For a sentence like (5):

(5) Il n'a pas fait grand-chose. (He did not do much.)

Cf English: He does not have the foggiest idea.

the underlying (affirmative) pov of those negative utterances cannot have the form *il a fait grand chose* or *He has the foggiest idea*, because those forms do not exist as such. But since pov's are not bound to a specific form, the linguist can pose, as underlying pov for (5) something like *il a fait plein de chose* ("He did a lot of things") or *He has some ideas*.

If we now try to define polyphony not in terms of the plurality of enunciative instances as we did above, but in terms of plurality of pov's, we obtain the following three or four cases (it is our classification and not Ducrot's):

- Polyphony of two contrasting or conflicting pov's (e.g. polemic negation)
- Polyphony of two semantically superposed pov's (e.g. presupposition)
- Polyphony of two semantically and syntactically juxtaposed pov's (e.g. direct reported speech) (1984a, 172)

Without explicitly choosing the relations between different points of views, Ducrot at least names some relations between them: presupposition, superposition and reaction to:

(7) Il y a polyphonie quand dans un énoncé il y a une multiplicité de pov qui "se juxtaposent, se superposent et se répondent" (Ducrot 1986, 26, our emphasis).

[We have polyphony in an utterance if there is a multiplicity of points of view that juxtapose to each other, superpose on each other or react to each other.]

An important question, a question that in my view has not received a clear answer yet, is whether the presence in one and the same utterance of two or more points of view combined with one or these three relations between the pov's is sufficient to create polyphony, especially in the case of juxtaposed pov's. To give just one example: is a sentence like (8) to be considered polyphonic because it contains two (semantically) juxtaposed points of view: pov1 = I have seen Paul – and pov2 = Paul was sun-sanned? (

(8) J'ai vu Paul, qui était bronzé.

[I have seen Paul, who was sun-sanned.]

That is a question about the boundaries of polyphony and its defining criteria, that has not been clearly addressed, in my view.

3. The modelization of polyphony by Nækse and the ScuPoLine

According to Nækse, Ducrot has never been interested in creating a real theory of polyphony (cf. Nækse, Fl tacrum & Norén 2004, 15), and that is exactly what the ScuPoLine wants to do.
3.1. Definition of polyphony by Nætke and the ScaPoLine

First of all, a few words about the definition of polyphony by Nætke and the ScaPoLine. In 1994, Nætke wrote:

(9) "La polyphonie, c'est bien évidemment cette présence de différents points de vue ou de 'voix' dans un seul énoncé". (p.146)

Polyphony is of course the presence of different points of view or voices in one and the same utterance.

In this citation we see that points of view is equated with points de vue.

In the version of the ScaPoLine the voices have disappeared from the definition, which only speaks of points of view, as we see in (10):

(10) "Si la phrase véhicule plus d'un pdv, on la qualifie de polyphonique".

Nætke, Fléttem & Norén (2004:52)

If the sentence has more than one pov, we will qualify it as polyphonic.

3.2. Main elements of the framework of Nætke and the ScaPoLine

Nætke and the ScaPoLine clearly state that their theory is loyal to Ducrot's views, at least in principle. Over the years, they have elaborated Ducrot's views, specifying them and making them more explicit in different respects. Let us begin with the enunciative instances.

3.2.1. Enunciative instances or discourse entities

A. What about the enunciator of Ducrot?

The ScaPoLine explicitly states that it has suppressed the term of "énonciateur" used by Ducrot (see Nætke, Fléttem & Norén, 2004, 20). Ducrot's notion of "énonciateur", however, was kept, in the form of the notion of source of a pov (cf. Nætke, Fléttem & Norén 2004, 30, n.12).

For the ScaPoLine, sources of pov's are variables, in the same way as the enunciators are for Ducrot. They are instantiated by one of the eight discourse entities the

In reading Ducrot (2001), one has the impression that in the author's view the ScaPoLine not only suppressed the term of "énonciateur" but also the notion, which is clearly not true.

Unlike Nætke and the ScaPoLine, Ducrot does not speak of enunciation of the enunciator by a specific discourse entity; he speaks of assemblage of the enunciator with a specific entity. In his analysis of poetic negation, the locutor L assembles to the enunciator Em, who defends the negative pov. In the analysis of the ScaPoLine, pov's have as its source one of the images of LOC, I (see p. 117).

ScapoLine distinguishes:

- the locutor of the utterance, l (corresponding to the locutor as such of Ducrot)
- the textual locutor, t
- the addressee as (the addressee as such)
- the addressee A (the addressee as an entity of the world) (see Norén 1999, 111 s.q.)
- the individual third person, t
- the collective non-homogeneous ON
- and a collective homogeneous ON, called the LAW (2004, 40)

More recently Nætke has added to them:

- the locutor taken at a certain point in time t, symbolized as t, in Nætke (2005, 114) and as I in Nætke (2006a, 254), an instance that is partly equivalent, as far as I can see, to the secondary locutor Ducrot (1984a, 196) used for the analysis of direct speech, whenever this secondary locutor refers to the same person as the locutor of the main sentence (I said: "I...").

Those discourse entities are images of the discourse participants (the speaker and the bearer) or of other entities mentioned in the discourse (individual or collective persons) (Nætke 2006a, 252). In comparison with the concrete persons that appear in texts and in communicative situations, discourse entities can be themselves considered variables, instantiated as they will be by concrete entities in the polyphonic configuration.

Though sources of pov's are, within the ScaPoLine, equivalent to Ducrot's notion of enunciator, there is, however, a big difference in the theoretical status of the concept of source of a pov and the status of the concept of enunciator. In the ScaPoLine, the locutor as such, can directly be the source of a pov, in the same way as a third individual, the addressee A or the collective ON for instance. That is not possible for the locutor as such in Ducrot's theory because for him pov's are by definition linked to enunciators, and not in a direct way to the locutor as such. It is only in a second "movement" or phase that enunciators are assimilated (or not) by Ducrot with the locutor.

B. What about the locutor of Ducrot?

One of the problems with Ducrot's notion of locutor is that the definition be given of it and the way be put it to work, gives it at least three different statuses. The locutor is:

- the source
- the addressee
- the textual locutor
What is really new in the ScPoLine is that it redistributes the different functions and characteristics of the locutor over different instances, some of them newly created.

One instance that was newly created is LOC, the "locuteur-constructeur-du-sens" (locutor as meaning constructor). The characteristics of this entity are the following:

- LOC assumes the responsibility for the utterance act (according to the utterance itself) (Nälke 2006b). That is also what the locutor of Ducrot does.
- LOC constructs the elements composing the polyphonic configuration (Nälke, forthcoming). He puts the discourse entities on stage as images of linguistic persons. That is also in a certain sense what the locutor of Ducrot does.
- According to Nälke (2006b), LOC not only creates images of others and of himself (L, L, and 1) but is himself an image, not an image of the locutor of course (because that would lead to a regressus ad infinitum), but of the "qaudeur," where the word qaudeur is surely taken by Nälke in a non-technical sense to refer to an individual of the first grammatical person.
- What differentiates LOC from his image L, 1, and 1 is that he cannot himself be a source of pov. He is the conductor, not a musician... But also that point is comparable with the properties of the locutor of Ducrot, who cannot himself have a pov either.
- According to Nälke (2001, 48) LOC is not himself a discourse entity (see also Nälke 2006a, 249 and Nälke 2006b). In Nälke, Flétrum & Norén (2004), however, this point is less clearly stated. It is said that "LOC is a discourse entity in the sense that he only exists in discourse" and never enters on stage himself.

3.2.2. Points of view

The ScPoLine has followed Ducrot in calling the speech objects implicated in the polyphony of an utterance "points of view," even if the theory surely does not subscribe to the underlying reasons for this notional choice. The ScPoLine indeed rejects Ducrot's idea that purely objective dicta do not exist and hence that it is possible, in the point of view, to separate a modus from a dictum. For the ScPoLine, each pov has a modus and a dictum (an idea put forward by Kromming since 1993, see section 4.1.4.1). In the formulation of Nälke, Flétrum & Norén (2004) and of Nälke (2006b), pov's have the following general form:

\[(X) \text{ (JUDGE (p))}\]

where X symbolizes the source, JUDGE the judgment and p the content.

In Dendalle and Colletier (2005), we have presented some problems caused by this representation of the general form of the pov, e.g., the fact that X, the source, is put inside the pov in this formalization, a decision which has the undesired consequence of placing the enunciative links (see below), which operate between the source and the pov, inside that pov. I will present some of the conclusions made in our 2005 article in section 3.2.3.

In all its efforts to make explicit the different relevant factors for the polyphonic description of utterances, there is at least one thing the ScPoLine has not yet done till now, that is to establish a clear and motivated list of modi necessary to describe the data. The few modi we find in Nälke, Flétrum & Norén (2004, 34, 41) are the following:

- "VRAI," "JUSTIÉ" "INJUSTIÉ," "PEUT-ÊTRE" and "TOP" ("TRUE", "JUSTIFIED", "UNJUSTIFIED", "PERHAPS" and "TOP(OST)"

9 In Nälke, Flétrum & Norén (2004), LOC seems to have a different status than his image, not being an image himself. This is not the case in Nälke (2006b), where LOC is put in line, as an image of the speaker, with the three other images that are distinguished.

10 "LOC is defined as an image of the speaker in his activity as responsible of [sic] the very utterance act." (Nälke 2006b).

11 "le locuteur-constructeur, LOC, garde un statut particulier. S'il est vrai que c'est un être discernable dans le sens où il existe parce que dans le discours, il n'entre jamais en attente comme source d'un élément d'apodose. (2004, 35) Il est locuteur et construit LOC, le sens spécial. Il est c'est à dire que he is a discourse entity in the sense that he only exists in discourse, one has to keep in mind that he never enters on stage himself as a source of a specific pov."
A closer look at this list suggests the following questions or remarks:

- Are "TRUE" and "JUSTIFIED" to be used for objects of judgments of different kinds (propositions for TRUE, speech acts for JUSTIFIED) or are they mere synonyms?
- Is it sound to name one of the judgments by the linguistic expression by which it is often expressed in the utterance ("PEUT-ÊTRE")?
- Do questions contain pov's? And what is for them the judgment on pov?

Another point the ScPaLine made more explicit than it was in Ducrot are the different types of pov it distinguishes:

- simple pov's
- hierarchical pov's
- relational pov's

Although Ducrot does not use these terms, the distinctions they describe are implicit in his analyses: in Ducrot's analysis of polemic negation for instance there is a hierarchical pov; in his analysis of the connector mais ("but") (1984a, 229), there is a relational pov.

3.2.3. Enunciative links

Enunciative links (or "links" for short) are an invention of the ScPaLine. They are meant to make explicit the relation between a discourse entity and a pov.

Ducrot does not use the term "enunciative link". When he talks about the relation between a discourse entity and a pov, he does not speak of source of a pov or responsibility for a pov; he speaks of it in a non-technical sense, using verbs as exprimer un pôle (1984a, 204, "express a pov"), donner un pôle (1984a, 223, "give a pov"), présenter un pôle (1984a, 221, "present a pov") or soutenir un pôle (1984a, 211, "defend a pov").

The ScPaLine has an asymmetrical opposition between the link of Responsibility, which is unique, and different links of Non-responsibility, ranging from complete acceptance of the pov, called "Accord" (Agreement), to complete Refutation of it, with, in the middle "Neuter", a position of non-commitment to the truth or "zero modality" in Kronning's terminology (Kronning 2005, see further section 4.1.1).

The link of Responsibility is defined by the notion of source. A discourse entity which is considered the source of a pov is declared responsible for it by the ScPaLine. A discourse entity which is considered not to be the source of a pov is declared Non-responsible for it.

Unfortunately the notion of source, important in this definition, is not explicitly defined by the ScPaLine. From some citations, like the one in (13)

(13) "La source, qui est dite avoir le pôle, est une variable" (Nenilke, Fléturak & Norén 2004, 32, our emphasis)

[The source, which is said to have the pôle, is a variable.]

we can understand that "to be the source of a pov" is simply "to have the pov", a paraphrase that shifts the problem to the meaning of the verb "to have". Under what conditions can an entity be said "to have" a pov?

Let us try to illustrate the problem with the description of the French concessive marker cetera in an utterance like:

(14) Cetera les pistes de ski en Suisse sont bonnes, mais tout y est plus cher qu'en France.

[For sure, the ski slopes in Switzerland are good, but everything there is more expensive than in France.]

If we analyze cetera, we see at least three components in its semantics:

- Cetera signals that the proposition that follows is true for the speaker (that is which distinguishes this marker from just-être ("maybe") when used in similar concessive structures. Let us call this first component the alethic component.
- Cetera signals that the proposition that follows is borrowed from someone else or at least attributed to someone else. Let us call this, for convenience, the evidential component (see Dendale & Tomaszewski 2001).
- Cetera signals that the proposition that follows is not considered argumentatively decisive for a conclusion. Let us call this the argumentative component.

An utterance with cetera expresses Non-responsibility for the ScPaLine, more specifically Agreement (Accord). This means that l cannot be the source of the pov expressed in utterance (14), The ski slopes in Switzerland are good. As far as the evidential component is concerned this is not problematic. But how can we then represent the alethic component of cetera, the fact that cetera indicates that the pov is (also) true for the speaker? Can we represent it as in (15), using the relative truth-values introduced by Berendsen (1981)?

(15) 1. TRUE (p : The ski slopes in Switzerland are good)
If the representation in (15) is correct, what prevents us from saying that (15) is a pov on the basis of the fact that a pov for the ScaPoLine is composed, by definition, of a judgment (here: "TRUE"), a source (here: 1), and a proposition or content (p)? The next question is then: whose pov is that or: who is the source of that pov? Can we conclude from the fact that 1 is the one for which the proposition is true that 1 is also the one who has the pov, who is the source of the pov? If the answer is "yes", we obtain something which can be represented as in (16a) and (16b) by inverting ScalPoLine's definition of the link of Responsibility:

(16) a. 1 is the source of the pov ([(1), TRUE (The ski slopes in Switzerland are good)])
   b. 1 is responsible for the pov ([(1), TRUE (The ski slopes in Switzerland are good)])

The conclusion of all this is that a pov would have to be considered a marker of Responsibility and not a marker of Agreement (and thus not a marker of Non-responsibility). Because this is not the conclusion of Nøkle and the ScaPoLine, there must be another parameter, which apparently is not made explicit by the ScaPoLine and which probably has to do with their definition of "source" and/or "pov", a parameter which should be made more explicit one day.

There would be other things to say about the enunciative links. I do not have the space to go into detail here. Some observations can be found in Dendla & Collier (2005). Let us comment on one other point.

The notion of source of a pov is used in the ScaPoLine in two ways or two places. Let us try to show this duality with the link of Responsibility, starting from an utterance like the one in (17), which contains a simple pov "It is true (His theory is very powerful)".

(17) His theory is very powerful
    pov1 = It is TRUE (His theory is very powerful)

If we take the definition of Responsibility, as given in (18a) and combine it with the general form of a pov in the formulation the ScaPoLine gave it to (cf. 18b), we see in (18c) that 1 appears twice as source, each time with a slightly different meaning. That means that the source of the judgment on p is the same discourse entity as the one who makes the judgment. We also observe in (18c) that there is co-reference between the one who is responsible for the pov and the one who makes the judgment inside the pov. That seems typical of the link of Responsibility.

(18) a. 1 is responsible for pov1 = 1 is the source of pov1
   b. pov1: [(1), TRUE (His theory is very powerful)]
   c. 1 is responsible for source of pov1: [(1), source (TRUE (His theory is very powerful))]

What is characteristic of the links of Non-responsibility is that there is necessarily non-co-reference between the two implied discourse entities. To illustrate this, let us take as an example the Non-responsibility link of Refutation, present in polemic negation:

(19) a. This wall is not white
   b. Mister Ducrot, you are not lazy. (an authentic utterance reported by Ducrot himself)

The utterances in (19) can be described as in (20):

(20) 1 Refutes pov1: [(The wall is white / Mister Ducrot is lazy) → 1 is not the source of pov1]

Let us now replace "pov1" in (20) by the general form of pov's as presented in Nøkle, Flærum & Norén (2004). We then obtain the representation in (21), where we see that there is non-co-reference between 1 and non-1:

(21) 1 is not the source of pov1: [(non-1), source (TRUE (The wall is white / Mister Ducrot is lazy))].


Unlike Nøkle and Bees, Hans Kronning did not develop a comprehensive framework of polyphony specifically aimed at the modelization of that notion or at the description of a broad range of phenomena of polyphony. Still he has contributed to some major developments in Ducrot's, Nøkle's and the ScaPoLine's version of that theory, by introducing in his empirical analyses of linguistic markers — mainly modal ones, like devezd and the French conditional — some important theoretical elements or principles for the description of polyphony. For that reason, it seems useful to examine here the most important innovations in the theory of polyphony for which he is responsible.
4.1 Main theoretical elements in Kronning’s version of a theory of polyphony

In general and at first glance, Kronning’s conception of polyphony and the elements of the framework he uses for the description of language data in terms of polyphony is rather close to the principles formulated by Ducrot and Nielke, as he underlines himself (2005, 299). But a closer look will reveal differences in terminology and formalization in some of his principles of analysis, differences that are rarely accidental (as I experienced through many discussions with the author), even if they are not always explicitly justified. Let us investigate these particularities in more detail.

4.1.1 Properties of the point of view according to Kronning

A first important element in the theorization of the notion of polyphony put forward by Kronning was the conceptualization of the notion of point of view as a linguistic entity which is necessarily composed of a modus (or modality) and a dictum (or propositional content), a conception that is incompatible with Ducrot’s position on that matter (see Kronning 1996, 44). For Ducrot indeed the linguistic object he suggested calling a “point of view” in 1984 literally expresses a point of view of a speaking subject on reality, and in that sense it is necessarily subjective. For Ducrot (1993, 113), there are no “pure descriptions of reality”, no completely objective statements about reality. Therefore it seems impossible to him to separate within the point of view – as Bally (1965, 36) did for the sentence – a subjective, modal component (the modus) from a purely objective (or “objectivated”) propositional content (the dictum), rejecting for the same reason, the notion of modality (1993, 128).

Kronning does not agree with that view. For him “the very existence of modal expressions in language shows the cognitive reality of the distinction between modus : dictum” (1996, 45), a distinction which, according to him, cannot be assimilated with the distinction between subjective and objective. For Kronning the subjectivity of a modal judgment is possibly not of the same kind as Ducrot’s inherent subjectivity of the point of view.

The modus and the dictum Kronning uses inside his pov’s have different enunciative statuses. The modus of a pov is never asserted, or, more precisely, it is never the object of what the author calls the enunciative operation or act of veridiction; a modus is shown ("conca"") (Kronning 1996), and whatever is only shown, is not justiciable in terms of truth or falseness and therefore cannot be the object of a debate. A dictum on the contrary can be asserted, because it is the object of an operation of veridiction (it is "verifiable"), and therefore it is justiciable in terms of truth or falseness (1996, 45).

In Kronning’s words there is a detailed list of the different modi that can appear in a pov. From his empirical analyses (e.g. 1996, 2005), we know that the basic modus is TRUE. This "assertoric" modality is what he calls a "simple modality" (Kronning 1996, 37n.; 2004). Other modi used in his analyses are: ZABO (which corresponds to "neither true nor false"), NECESSARILY TRUE, PROBABLY TRUE and POSSIBLY TRUE.

The three latter are "complex modalities", composed by a "copic" (e.g. TRUE), and a "prerotic" (NECESSARILY, PROBABLY, POSSIBLY). Other complex modalities used in Kronning’s system are: [?] TRUE ("Is it true that ...?") and [!] TRUE ("Make it true that ...!"). The symbols "?" and "!" symbolize the pretopics "interrogative" and "injunctive".

FALSE is rarely or never used as a modus in Kronning’s analyses, as far as I found out, but that is probably pure coincidence. It seems to me that in his system this modus must have a place, for example for the description of negative sentences like (22), where a modus FALSE could be said to apply to the dictum of the sentence focus pour habitue, at least in a certain reading of that sentence (for the notion of focus or "foyer", see below section 4.2.2).

(22) Elle n’est pas venue avec son mari.

[She did not come with her husband.]

Modality or modus is defined in Kronning’s system as an epistemic quantification on possible worlds (1996, 30), with possible worlds being mental entities, rather than abstract, aethetic states. They are to be distinguished from modalization, which is an operation by which the modus of a particular dictum is shown (not asserted) by the discourse individual responsible for the pov. Parallel to the abovementioned types of modalities, a distinction is made between simple modalization, zero modalization and complex modalization of a dictum.

13 The French term “justiciable”, used by Kronning, will be resaenised here by “justiciable”, an adjective meaning "capable of being decided according to legal principles by a court", whereas the use less strictly confine the pov to a justiciable issue. [http://dictionary.reference.com/consulted on 04,02,2003]. The term “justiciable” as here used results from both a restriction and an extension of its legal use, by the fact that on the one hand the legal component is dropped and replaced by a "verifying subject", whereas it may be "and on the other hand by the fact that it is combined with the complement in terms of truth or falseness".

14 Kronning (1996, 40) explains that basic interrogatory acts like assertions or interrogatives are the result of the combined action of two enunciative operations: veridiction and showing.
An example of a linguistic marker of zero modality and zero modalization is the French epistemic conditional (Kroning 2002; 2005). Its use in a sentence changes the default modality True the sentence would have in the indicative mood (present, future or past perfect tense) into a zero modality by the operation of zero modalization. By that operation the speaker explicitly refuses to commit himself to the truth of the dictum (2002, 7).

This zero modalization, caused by the presence in the sentence of the morpheme of the epistemic conditional can, in a certain sense, be "overruled" or "neutralized" by lexical indications that appear in the sentence but outside the domain of application of the conditional. These elements describe the epistemic attitude of the speaker by means of an operation of veridiction of those attitudes. The results can be that the global epistemic value of the sentence is something like certainly True or certainly false. This last point can be illustrated by the following examples constructed by Kroning (2005, 303):

(23) D'après Marie (Paul revait riche). De fait il l'est.
   (According to Mary (Paul revait riche). And indeed he is.)

(24) D'après Marie (Paul revait riche), mais il ne l'est pas.
   (According to Mary (Paul revait riche), but he is not.)

The domain of application of the epistemic conditional revait, called "domaine de médiation" (domain of mediation) (Kroning 2002; 2005), is indicated within braces. The conditional revait which appears inside these braces shows a zero modus, indicating the neither True nor False status of the pov that it domain; the proposition that follows describes the epistemic attitude the speaker has regarding the pov within the epistemic domain of the conditional: a certainty of falseness attitude in (24), a certainty of truth attitude in (23).

An example of a linguistic marker of complex modality is the modal verb devoir. Epistemic devoir, according to Kroning (e.g. 1993; 1996) expresses necessity of truth, a complex modality thus, which is weakened to Probability of truth by the fact that devoir constitutes the modus of the pov, a modus that, by its very nature, can only be "shown", not asserted. This opposes epistemic devoir to deontic and alethic devoir, which are part of the dictum of the pov and not of the modus, and as such are asserted rather than shown.

One of the most recent innovations in Kroning's conception of polyphony is the possibility he introduced of having a special "category" of pov's, pov's that are themselves utterances (énoncés):

(25) "La plupart des instances discursives sont liées à un point de vue (Pov).
Certains PDV sont des énoncés, alors que d'autres ne le sont pas". (2005, 299).
[Most of the discourse instances are linked to a point of view (pov). Certain pov's are utterances; others are not.]

In the case of the epistemic conditional for instance, the pov's assumed by l and by l5 (i.e. the original locutor of that pov (see section 4.1.2. below) are considered to be utterances (2005, 301). We will see below that Beez also uses the utterance as the basic object of polyphonic utterance, claiming that a polyphonic utterance contains a hierarchy of two utterances, discarding in this way the notion of pov in favour of the notion of utterance as the basic object of polyphony. On the other hand, we will also see that in his framework Beez fuses the existence, via a distinction he makes between two types of discourse entities, of two types of objects of polyphony within the polyphonic utterance, an "object of content" and an "object of form or expression", without however going so far as to provide names for those distance objects. That is probably what Kroning is trying to do, without being very explicit, when he observes that for him the discourse entities can be bound not only to pov's but also to utterances or words ("paroles") (2005, 299-300) and ms 5 and 6.

What is also interesting is his definition of the utterance, which diverges from the one proposed by Ducrot, for whom the utterance act, of which the utterance is the product, is a historical event:

(26) "Un énoncé est le produit d'un acte d'énonciation, effectivement accompli ou simplement imaginé et représenté dans le discours, аvant une force illocutoire" (2005, 299).
[An utterance is the product of an enunciative act, effectively accomplished or simply imagined and represented in discourse, that has an illocutionary force.]

What can seem strange at first glance is the fact that an utterance is defined here as something that can be "simply imagined", a possibly virtual object thus. As such it has a characteristic that pov's as used by Ducrot also had, namely the fact that they also could be only imagined (i.e. have not necessarily been uttered). The motivation for Kroning to accept imagined utterance lies in the existence of utterances like:

(27) If John says "I was with my sister", call him a liar!
(28) John has never said: "I was with my sister".
where there is no report of an effective utterance act of John in which he produced the utterance "I was with my sister", but only of a potential (27), or even a denied one (28). The segment "I was with my sister" has an illusionary force, but lacks the property that is effectively actualized in an utterance act. The utterance act of which it is supposed to be the product belongs to a fictional world or a possible world, not to the actual world. In this, Kronning does not make a distinction between real enunciative acts and represented enunciative acts. It is difficult to see for the moment the whole set of consequences of this decision.

Apart from the fact that a point of view for Kronning has a modus and a dic- tum, an analysis that Nølke and the ScaPoLine have adopted, the representation of the form of the pov by Kronning is quite different from the one given in Nølke, Flétan & Nordén (2004) (see section 3.2.2 above). For Kronning, pov's are linked to what he calls "instances discursive" (discourse instances, 2005, 299), but unlike the ScaPoLine, these instances do not appear inside the very structure of the pov, as is shown by (29).

They remain outside of it:

(29) POV - l_1, Modus (Dicturn) (Kronning 1996, 44)

In this representation we see on the one hand that the POV is linked to the locutor l_1, and on the other hand that it is articulated in two correlative parts, Modus and Dicturn.

Let us now have a closer look at the different discourse instances Kronning distinguishes in his descriptions of polyphonic markers.

4.1.2. The discourse entities for Kronning

Discourse instances for Kronning are variables, comparable with the sources in Nølke's system and the enunciators in Ducrot's system. There is, however, one big difference between them and the sources of Nølke or the enunciators of Ducrot. Discourse instances for Kronning are entities which are not necessarily linked to pov's. They can also be entities to which are attributed specific enunciative activities (e.g. the borrowing of a pov from another discourse entity) or epistemic attitudes (of certainty or uncertainty) (2005, 302).

Discourse instances are instantiated by one of the existing "étres de discours" (discourse entities, p.299). Let us examine the discourse entities Kronning uses in his studies.

15 Epistemic attitudes are mental states (2005, 302), not pov's. They can of course be described linguistically and in that case become pov's.

- L_2, the locutor of the utterance (also present in the ScaPoLine, with the same name), corresponds to the entity called locuteur as such by Ducrot. The locuteur of the utterance is an instance that only exists in the hic et nunc of the utterance act. He assumes modal responsibility for the utterance (2005, 299), and thus corresponds to the "modalisiering discourse instance" (2005, 300).

- L_1, the textual locutor for Nølke and the ScaPoLine, the locuteur as entity of the world for Ducrot. He is rephrased locuteur du discours ("locuteur of the discourse") by Kronning (2005, 299). L_1 has an existence that is not limited to the hic et nunc of the utterance act; he is presented by the utterance as a cognitive subject who has encyclopedic knowledge, a discursive memory (1996, 44), who constructs the (broadest) discourse, the one also to whom are attributed the epistemic attitudes regarding borrowed pov's (2005, 299-300). Both L_1 and L_2 are images of LOC, the locuteur as constructor of meaning (as is also the case within the ScaPoLine).

- On, the collective locuteur, or rex publica (also present in Nølke and the ScaPoLine).

- LOC, the locuteur as constructor of meaning of the ScaPoLine, who never enters the enunciative stage himself, who is also the one responsible for borrowing the content of the actual utterance from a source locuteur (Kronning, this volume).

- LS, the source locuteur ("le locuteur source"), which is not an image of LOC, as are L_1 and L_2, and in that sense has a status comparable with the third locuteur t of Nølke and the ScaPoLine.

4.1.3. Enunciative links?

In his framework, Kronning never explicitly talks about "enunciative links", the elements "constructed by LOC that link discourse entities to points of view" (Nølke, Flétan & Nordén 2004, 177). Enunciative links do not have a place (yet) in Kronning's framework. For him pov's are of course also linked to discourse entities, as is illustrated by (29), but the "links" are not the ones found in the ScaPoLine.

Three types of relations between a discourse entity and a pov are mentioned (Kronning 1996, 152).
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(31) He met his wife in 1984.

In this utterance there is a part that is given or known information (Kronning calls it "substrate") and a part that is new information (called "fayer"21). Both layers are described as pov's. The pov of the fayer is always of the form: "X = ..." with on the right side of the equality sign a constant (e.g. "1984" for utterance (31)). (31) would then be analyzed as:

(32) \[ \text{POV} \text{SUBSTR} = \text{L}, \text{POV} \text{FA} = \text{R} : \text{TRUE} \text{MOD} (X = \text{1984}) \text{FACT} \]

A simple utterance like (31) is thus described as polyphonic because of the presence of two pov's, one for the "given" or "previously known" part of the utterance (the "substrate") and one for the "new" part of the utterance (the "fayer"). These pov's are called "stratificational pov's" in Nefke & Olsen (2000, 52).

Kronning's approach shows that even very simple utterances can be shown, in a very technical and formal way, to be polyphonic due to the presence of constants (dicas) that have to be attributed to dissimilar utterances. The question is whether this type of polyphony can be aligned, as far as its nature is concerned, with other more visible types of polyphony like echo-utterances, irony, negative utterances, etc.

4.3. Polyphonic data treated

As we have said above, at the beginning of section 4, Kronning has not developed a comprehensive framework aimed at the description of a large range of polyphonic data, but a consistent set of polyphonic and enunciative principles necessary and sufficient for the description of certain linguistic markers: the French conditional and the French modal verb *aurait* in its deontic, alethic and epistemic senses. Sporadically other markers were touched upon, like for instance the morpheme of the imminent future ("futur proche" with French *aller").

Beyond the description of these markers, his framework of stratificational analysis is also designed to treat phenomena like focalization and presupposition, thematic role, sentence modalities like the declarative, the interrogative and the injunctive, and auxiliaries.

21 It is difficult to translate that term into English because the term *fayer* is itself used by Kronning to refer to the enunciative constituent which is the formal counterpart of his "fayer". Therefore we will use the French terms in our overview.
Although some theoretical principles and descriptions have undergone adjustment from one study to another, it is striking that the framework as a whole is particularly stable, with most of the principles, definitions and elements unchanged for more than a decade.

5. Linguistic approach to dialogism and the praxematics of Jacques Bres

Parallel to the theory of polyphony of Ducrot and to the Scandinavian branch of linguistic polyphonists, Jacques Bres and a few other linguists belonging to the linguistic school of the “praxématique”, have developed since the mid-90s, a variant of those theories, more loyal and closer to Bakthin than the existing frameworks. Bres explicitly prefers to speak of dialogism instead of polyphony. According to him and to Alexandra Nowakowska, Ducrot wrongly proposed the term polyphony for a linguistic phenomenon that Bakthin named dialogism.

5.1. Definition of dialogism by Bres

The term dialogism, according to Bres and Nowakowska, has never received a linguistically operational definition in Bakthin’s work. Therefore Bres proposes the following definition:

(33) “Le dialogisme est la "capacité de l’énoncé à faire entendre, outre la voix de l’énonciateur, une (ou plusieurs) autre(s) voix qui le feuilletent énonciativement" (Bres 2001, 83).”

(34) “Le dialogisme est cette dimension constitutive qui vient à ce que le discours, dans sa production, rencontre (presque obligatoirement) d’autres discours” (2001, 84, our emphasis).”

This definition—still rather similar to the one given by Ducrot—can be completed with two other ones, which are more related to the notion of dialogue:

- Interdiscursive dialogism is the most common case. It is the relation between an utterance and preceding utterances on the same subject. It corresponds to the notion of polyphony commonly used by Ducrot and the ScoPoLine.
- In the interlocutive dialogism the enunciator anticipates the reaction an addressee could have to his utterance. This anticipation can take the form, for example, of a clarification of terms the addressee would probably not understand, clarification signaled by a reformulation marker.

[Dialogism is the way for a monological text to signify verbal interaction.]

Dialogism is defined here as the encounter with other discourses or the expression of verbal interaction inside a genre that is not a dialogue but a monologue. The point that is important here is that the notion of dialogism necessarily conceptualizes the voices or discourses in a relation of interaction, rather than in a relation of juxtaposition.

For Bres, as for Bakthin (see Bres 2005, 53–54), dialogism is internal dialogue, which is opposed to external dialogue.22 External dialogue is defined by Bres (2001, 89) as a sequence of talking turns. Internal dialogue (or dialogism) is the fact that an utterance (even when not inserted in a real dialogue) also reacts to utterances that proceeded and that gave rise to it or anticipates utterances that are still to come.23

A dialogic utterance is most generally characterized by a “dédoublement énonciatif” (enunciative doubling). This is the possibility to distinguish two utterances placed into a hierarchy: the embedding utterance (“l’énoncé enveloppant”) and the embedded utterance (“l’énoncé enveloppé”),” (Bres & Nowakowska 2004).

Following Bakthin, Bres distinguishes in his analyses between interdiscursive dialogism and interlocutive dialogism (Bres 2001, 84), a distinction which is not made by Ducrot nor by the ScoPoLine.

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- In the interlocutive dialogism the enunciator anticipates the reaction the addressee could have to his utterance. This anticipation can take the form, for example, of a clarification of terms the addressee would probably not understand, clarification signaled by a reformulation marker.

22 The French adjective “dialogique” is used for the first; the adjective “dialogal” for the second.
23 “Un énoncé, quoi qu’il ne soit répondu à des énoncés qui l’ont précédé et anticipé sur des énoncés ultérieurs qu’il suscite” (Bres 2001, 84).
5.2. Main elements of the framework of Bres

Let us now have a closer look at the framework for the linguistic analysis of dialogism that Jacques Bens has elaborated within the school of praxematics (Bens 2001, 84), starting with the enunciative entities.

5.2.1. The enunciative entities for Bres

In Bens's system, the main protagonists in the internal dialogue are called *enunciateurs* ("enunciators"). A dialogical utterance is an utterance that has two or more enunciators. They are necessarily engaged in a *hierarchic* relation, one with the other, a point which is less clearly stressed by Ducrot and the ScaPoLine.

The enunciators are symbolically represented as $E_1$ (with a capital) and $e_1$ (with a small letter), a convention that underscores the hierarchy between them. If there is a need for a third level, the author uses $e_1$. For the moment, no more than three levels are provided for in his system.

Enunciators correspond to the "sujets modulé" of Bally: they are responsible for the modal and the discursive actualization of their respective utterances. More on this below (cf. section 5.2.2).

Because of the hierarchy existing between them, $E_1$ and $e_1$ do not have the same status: $e_1$ is a variable, which can refer to different instances (to $E_1$, to $e_2$, to the addressee of the embedding utterance, to a third individual person or the collective ON).

In Bres's system there are two corollaries to the "enunciateurs", namely two "enonciatrices" (let us call them "addresses"). They are symbolized as $E_2$ and $e_2$.

Besides the enunciators, the system also contains *locutors* ("locuteurs"). Because of the binary system of Bres, there are two instances of the locutor: the *embedding locutor*, $L_1$, and the *embedded locutor*, $l_1$. Compared to the enunciator, they are of secondary importance. The locutors correspond to the "sujets paralé" of Bally (see Bens & Nowakowska 2005, 4). They are responsible for the phonetic or graphic actualization of the utterance (Bres & Vévine 2002, 164-165). As an example of linguistic traces of the locutor found in the utterance, Bres & Vévine cite the case of a reported speech in which the locutor $L_1$ imitates voice characteristics (e.g. a typical pronunciation of certain words) or graphical particularities of the locutor $l_1$, of whom $L_1$ reports the utterance (e.g. a typical way of writing or spelling something, typical orthographic errors made, etc.) (see also Derrie, Siblot & Vévine 2001, 173). Let us present here the two examples given in Bres & Vévine (2002, 165-166). In (36) the speaker is reporting the words of a friend of his imitating his Corsican accent; in (37) a journalist deliberately produces an orthographic error in a title in a journal, imitating and deforming the famous sentence "Omar m'a tué" ("Omar has kill

me") written in blood on a wall by Ghislaine Maecaela, a widow batters to death at her Riviera villa in 1991:

(36) alors Recanu il se lève "c'est toi que tu veux nous tuer" à sait avec son accent corse là
[then Recanu gets up and says "it's you that want to kill us", you know with his Corsican accent]

(37) Edouard m'a tué [Edouard has kill me]

In (36), we can say that the actual locutor, $L_1$ speaks in the accent of another locutor $l_1$; in (37) the journalist writes with the words and (erroneous) spelling of the dying woman in a parodic utterance on prime minister Edouard Balladur in the context of a dispute around the financing of the audiovisual media.

Let us now try to find the equivalents of all these notions in the frameworks of Ducrot and the ScaPoLine.

A. The enunciators $E_1 / e_1$

$e_1$ is a variable that corresponds to the Murrow of the ScaPoLine. In Ducrot's system, $e_1$ would be an enunciator. $e_1$ can be instantiatied by $E_1$, by $E_2$ or by a third person, which shows that $E_1$ is not a variable in the same way as $e_1$, which it can instantiate.

$E_1$ combines characteristics of the different images of LOC $L_1$ and $L_1$, as possible sources of piv, with characteristics of LOC, the locutor as contentor (namely when Bens says that "E1 puts the enunciator e1 on stage", 1998, 199). It refers invariably to the instance linguistically realized by $e_1$ (Bens 1998, 196, 2001, 85) and is thus not a variable in the same way as $e_1$. Within Ducrot's terminology, $E_1$ is basically an enunciator, who has a piv (which is called *utemnator* by Bres, as we will see below in section 5.2.2), but since $E_1$ can also put an enunciator on stage, he is at the same time the equivalent of Ducrot's locutor, and since $E_1$ manifests himself in the utterance by the markis of the first person, he can be both Ducrot's locutor as such and his locutor as an entity of the world. The problem with Ducrot's notion of locutor (referred to above in section 3.2.1.1), namely that it combines too many roles, is even more serious for Bres's $E_1$, because it combines most of the functions of Ducrot's locutor with the functions of Ducrot's enunciator.

In the same way as the LOC of the ScaPoLine, $E_1$, according to Bres, cannot be erased from the utterance. In this respect $E_1$ is slightly different from the locutor of Ducrot, which, as we have seen in section 3.2.1.1, can be completely absent from some utterances, namely from historical utterances.
5.2.2. Utterances instead of points of view

Let us now turn to the equivalents of the *pov's* in Breton's system.

One of the most striking differences between the system of Breton and the frameworks of the ScaPoLine and of Ducrot is that Breton does not use the notion of *point of view*. Instead he uses the notion of *actualized utterance* ("enonce actualisé"). An utterance can be modalized, deictically and phonetically or graphically actualized. For our purpose here, the modal actualization is the most important, because it allows Breton to distinguish between monological utterances and dialogical utterances:

- A *monological utterance* is an utterance in which a modus is applied to a dictum (by an operation called *modal actualization*) (cf. Bally).
- A *dialogical utterance* is an utterance of which the modus is not applied to a dictum, but to an entity *represented* as already having the status of utterance, a unity thus which has already been modalized by an enunciator *el* (Breton 2001, 87).

To illustrate this, let us take the example of the confirmation marker *hien* ("indeed") in a sentence like (38):

(38) Les trois bergeres occidentales des Khmers rouges ont *hien* été assassinées. (*Le Monde*)

(The three western hostages of the Khmers Rouges have indeed been assassinated.)

The utterance in (38) is dialogical because, due to the presence of *hien* ("indeed"), it refers to a prior utterance, *The three western hostages of the Khmers rouges have been assassinated*, which resulted from the application of the modus "TRUE" to a dictum ("The three western hostages of the Khmers Rouges have been assassinated"). The use of the confirmation marker *hien* / *indeed* in (38) indicates that the enunciator *el* reappplies the modus "TRUE" to the first utterance. *El* does not confirm a simple dictum but a previous utterance.

The problem is that it is difficult for the moment to see what the theoretical consequences are of the author's decision to let modal apply to already modalized utterances.

First of all there is a terminological problem. By replacing the term (and notion) of *pov* by the term (and notion) of *utterance*, Breton cannot but use the term *utterance* to refer to two different things, each with a different status: the actual utterance, produced by the speaker (e.g. (38), and a non-actual utterance, object of the analyzing linguist, that we cannot observe directly and which is in a hierarchical relation to the one we can observe. This also means that utterances, since they are entities that have been ac-
realized, are less abstract entities than some kinds of pov's of the ScaPoLine or some pov's in the layered representation of Kronning (1996).

A second problem is to know how exactly the application of a modus to an already modalized utterance works, and what the possible effects of this application are. Let us take as an example the dictum <John be *pous* at home> to which applies the interrogative modus "Is it true that?" (? TRUE) in Kronning's formalism. This gives us the (monological) utterance

(39) Is John at home?

Imagine now that this utterance is reported by the speaker e.g. in a construction of direct discourse:

(40) Paul cried out: "Is John at home?"

Since direct reported speech is a phenomenon of dialogism for Bres, it should be a good illustration for him of the application of a modus to an already modalized dictum. But the question is: Which modus is applied to which utterance? As for the utterance, the answer certainly is the utterance "Is John at home?", because that is the only part of the construction that was already modalized, previously to e. But what about the modus of the other part of the utterance Paul cried out? It seems logical that its modus is TRUE. But does this modus TRUE also apply to the interrogative utterance e? And if so, does the application of the modus TRUE to an utterance that already has a modus (? TRUE) change, neutralize or replace this (interrogative) modus? Rather it seems to us that it leaves the modus of e untouched. And if this is so, what does it mean to say, as Bres does, that in dialogical utterances a modus applies to an already modalized utterance?

What we have said for direct reported speech is also valid for indirect reported speech:

(41) Paul asked if John was at home.

The morphemes ask if indicate that <John be *pous* at home> has a modus (? TRUE) for e. Stating that in dialogical utterances the modus applies to an utterance instead of a dictum, is not enough. One has to explicitly indicate how this is concretely realized in terms of linguistic constructions.

24 One could even say that in the case of a modalized introductory proposition "Paul might have cried out" the modus (Possibly True) does only affect the introductory proposition, and not the reported (interrogative) proposition (thanks to Ton De Rycker for a remark that led to this observation).
More generally, what is typical of Bres’s system is that a basic and systematic distinction is made between the instances related to the embedded utterance, E, and the ones related to the embedded utterance, e. This has of course to do with the importance Bres attaches to the hierarchical character of the relation between the two utterances. This systematic distinction in levels for the indication of utterances, enunciators and addressees is absent in Ducrot and the SeaPoLine, where the numbering of the enunciators E1, E2 or pov1, pov2 does not suggest any hierarchical relationship whatsoever.

5.2.3. Enunciative links?
In Bres there is no theorization of the enunciative links between the discourse entity and the pov that the SeaPoLine distinguishes. In this respect Bres resembles Ducrot (and to a lesser extent) Kronning; he is of course forced to specify the position of E towards e, speaking of revaluation of e (1998, 198) or rejection (“rejet”, 1998, 203), but there is no effort of axiomatization, systematization or classification of these links.

5.3. Polyphonic data
If we compare, as a final point, the polyphonic or dialogical markers described by the different authors we have studied here, we see that the largest inventory of listed markers is to be found in Bres. Below is a (semantically) structured list based on a semantic classification of diatopism markers to be found in Bres (1998) and (1999):

- irony
- negation (comprising: revaluation (“not A but B”), without or with left dislocation (“the X, it is not A but B”) and with or without an left construction (“it is not A that B but C”)), and what Bres calls “rechâssissement” (re-enforcement: “not only A but also B”)
- comparison (“more than...”, “less than...”, …)
- concession and opposition
- confirmation
- interrogation
- presupposition (comprising: presupposition of existence attached to nominalizations, presupposition with opposite relative clause)
- topedex abstraction subordinate subject sentences (Qui Paul sait que tu est étrange (“That Paul has come is strange”))
- reported speech
- echo-utterances
- the French ‘conditionnel’ with heurary value

- automatic modalization (If I may use that expression …)
- deformation and deviation of well-known utterances or proverbs, fragments of utterances or even simple expressions, a technique called “déroturisme” by Bres and his followers.

Most of the described data have previously been described in the polyphonic frameworks of Ducrot or Nélice, but some of them are new (e.g. comparison, deviation). One of the most obvious advantages of Bres’s approach is that all the data are apparently analyzed with exactly the same basic theoretical apparatus, the same symbols and the same principles of description. This has not always been the case, in my view, with Nélice and the SeaPoLine, probably because their studies are spaced out over many years and were never reintegrated into the theoretical model, which was under constant evolution.

6. Conclusion
In this paper I have given a presentation of the main elements and aspects of Ducrot’s (1994a) account of polyphony and compared them with the corresponding elements in three other frameworks: the model of the SeaPoLine by Nélice and the Scandinavian Polyphonists (Nélice, Flétum & Norén 2005), the enunciative theorization by Kronning (2003) and the descriptive system of Bres (1999, 2003). Other frameworks or variants of the ones treated here have not been taken into account in this study, but will be on another occasion.

The sometimes remarkable differences between the frameworks studied here have brought up some elements which would deserve closer scrutiny: e.g. the nature of the objects of polyphony (points of view or utterances, semantic ones and formal ones) or the necessity to distinguish an insistance responsible for the content of the point of view (or utterance) and another responsible for the form of the utterance (cf. the distinction between E1 and L1 for Bres for example).

23 It is a mistake, in my opinion, to consider utterances that are alternations of well-known utterances (“déroturisms”), and that intercalate adjectives to those utterances, to be markers of polyphony. What is right, it is that these deviant utterances are polyphonic utterances, but the deviation itself is not a marker of polyphony.

26 Cf. "lesenülliche de cette façon, nous nous rapprochons dans la catégorie des marqueurs de diathèse, relève d'un même phénomène, et peut être analysé à partir de même analyse diathèse." (All these facts, grouped together in the category of markers of diathèse, belong to the same phenomenon, and can be analyzed by way of the same theoretical tools.) (Bres & Vitré 2002, 161, our emphasis).
In some further work, different analyses — polyphonic and non-polyphonic — of the same phenomenon will also be examined and compared, which will complete the comparison of these merely theoretical aspects.

References


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